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- IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS -STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION and/or
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioners,
v.

)

Court of Appeals

)

Appellate Court No.: 980227-CA

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION, EMPLOYERS' )
REINSURANCE FUND, and KATHLEEN MAE )
MOORE, surviving spouse of William Moore,

Priority No.: 7

Respondents.

JURISDICTION IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§34A-2-801 (1997), Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16 (1998), Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (1996),
and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) requires extended benefits beyond

312 weeks from an employer or carrier.
2.

Whether Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988), as amended, eliminates liability of

the Employers' Reinsurance Fund to pay death benefits.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case presents a pure question of statutory construction which should be reviewed
under a "correction of error" standard. Brown & Root v. Industrial Commission. 947 P.2d
671 (Utah 1997); State v. Harmon. 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1996); and Zissi v. State Tax
Commission. 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992).

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS

1.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953)1:

If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at
the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all
reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the industrial
commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits: but the liability of
the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not be extended, and the additional
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of
Section 35-1-68.

2.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988):

Employers' Reinsurance Fund - Injury causing death - Burial expenses - Payments to
dependents.
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35. This fund shall succeed to all
monies previously held in the "Special Fund," the "Combined Injury Fund," or the
"Second Injury Fund." Whenever this code refers to the "Special Fund," the
"Combined Injury Fund," or the "Second Injury Fund" that reference is considered to
1

This statute has been recodified, without substantive change, as Utah Code Ann. §34A2-416 (1997). Because Mr. Moore died on May 13, 1991, all statutory references contained
herein will be to those statutes in existence at the time of his death.
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be the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall direct its distribution.
Reasonable administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of the fund. The
attorney general shall appoint a member of his staff to represent the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against it.
(2) If injury causes death within a period of six years from the date of the accident,
the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as
provided in Section 35-1-81, and further benefits in the amounts and to the persons as
follows:
(a)(i) If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment by
the employer or its insurance carrier shall be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly
wage at the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85 % of the state
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of
$45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent minor child
under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children,
but no exceeding the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury,
and not exceeding 85 % of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per
week. Compensation shall continue during dependency for the remainder of the period
between the date of the death and the expiration of six years or 312 weeks after the date
of the injury.
(ii) The weekly payment to wholly dependent persons during dependency following
the expiration of the first six-year period described in Subsection (2)(a)(i) shall be an
amount equal to the weekly benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons during that
initial six-year period, reduced by 50% of any weekly federal Social Security death
benefits paid to those wholly dependent persons.
(iii) The issue of dependency shall be subject to review by the commission at the
end of the initial six-year period and annually thereafter. If in any such review it is
determined that, under the facts and circumstances existing at teat time, the applicant is
no longer a wholly dependent person, the applicant may be considered a partly
dependent or nondependent person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission
may determine under Section (2)(b)(ii).
(iv) For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse of a
deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a sixyear period from the date of death of the employee. This presumption shall no apply
after the initial six-year period and, in determining the then existing annual income of
the surviving spouse, the commission shall exclude 50% of any federal Social Security
death benefits received by that surviving spouse.
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(b)(i) If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death, the payment shall
be 66 2/3% of the decedent's average weekly w£ge at the time of the injury, but not
more than a maximum of 85 % of the state average weekly wage at the time of the
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week. Compensation shall
continue during dependency for the remainder of the period between the date of death
and the expiration of six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury as the commission
in each case may determine. Compensation may not amount to more than a maximum
of $30,000. the benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the
circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at thee date of injury, and any
amount awarded by the commission under this subsection shall be consistent with the
general provision of this title.
(ii) Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent under Subsection (2)(a)(iii)
shall be determined by the commission in keeping with the circumstances and
conditions of dependency existing at the time of the dependency review and may be
paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the maximum weekly rate that partly dependent
person would receive if wholly dependent.
(iii) Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during their
dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier.
(c) If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent persons at the
time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as it considers just and
equitable; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all parties concerned to not
exceed the maximum provided for by law.
(d) If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of death and the total
amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier to said dependents,
prior to the termination of dependency, including any remarriage settlement, does not
exceed $30,000, the employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between
the amount paid and $30,000 into the Employers' Reinsurance Fund provided for in
Subsection (1).

3.

Petitioners believe the following case to be persuasive authority:

Hales v. Industrial Commission. 854 P.2d 537 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). A copy of Hales
is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit "1."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceeding
This case involves a dispute over the legal interpretation of Utah's Workers
Compensation Act relative to the payment of death benefits. Kathleen Mae Moore, the
surviving spouse of William Ray Moore, was receiving death benefits as a result of Mr.
Moore's death on May 13, 1991. Death benefits were paid to Kathleen Mae Moore by
petitioner, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, through February 10, 1997. Thereafter,
petitioner Liberty Mutual Insurance Company has continued to pay death benefits to Kathleen
Mae Moore based upon a stipulation of the parties that the parties may seek a legal ruling
relative to whether Ms. Moore's ongoing benefits should be paid by petitioners or by the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF").
This case was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Barbara A. Elicerio who, on
August 4, 1997, set a briefing scheduling for the parties. (R. at 55.) On September 5, 1997,
petitioners filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. On September 25, 1997, ERF filed its own
Motion to Dismiss as well as a brief in response to petitioner's Motion for Summary
Judgment. On October 3, 1997, petitioners filed a Reply Memorandum.
On December 18, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Elicerio issued her Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. A copy of this Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "2."
On January 16, 1998, petitioners filed a Motion for Review with the Appeals Board of the
Labor Commission of Utah. On March 27, 1998, the Appeals Board issued it Order Denying

-5-

the Motion for Review. A copy of the Order of the Appeals Board is attached hereto as
Exhibit W3.M
On April 24, 1998, petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the Utah Court of
Appeals.
Statement of Facts
Because this dispute involves a legal interpretation of certain Utah statutes, no
testimony was actually taken at the Labor Commission (R. at 47, 55.) However, there was no
dispute among the parties about the basic factual development of this case.2
1.

On July 1, 1989, William Ray Moore, an employee of respondent Stouffer

Food Corporation, suffered a severe on-the-job injury. He received temporary total disability
benefits, temporary partial disability benefits, and permanent partial disability benefits at
various times following his injury through May 13, 1991.
2.

On May 13, 1991, William Ray Moore died as a result of complications from

his industrial injury.
3.

Kathleen Mae Moore is the surviving spouse of William Ray Moore. Following

the death of William Ray Moore, Kathleen Mae Moore began receiving death benefits.
Thereafter, Ms. Moore continued to receive death benefits from petitioner Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company upon a stipulation of the parties that the parties may seek a legal
interpretation of whether Ms. Moore's ongoing death benefits should be paid by petitioners or
by ERF.
2

In fact, the attorney for ERF used the identical statement of facts in its brief as
previously set forth by petitioners. (R. at 57, 75.) Respondent Moore did not file a separate brief;
rather, she joined in the brieffiledby ERF. (R. at 72.)
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4.

Kathleen Mae Moore is currently still dependent upon death benefits.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) specifically limits the liability of an employer or
carrier in death cases. It expressly places ongoing liability for such benefits on the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund. Given the historical context of Section 70, and as found by the Utah Court
of Appeals in Hales, supra, petitioners submit that this Court should adopt the plain language
of the statute and order ongoing death benefits to be paid to Ms. Moore from ERF.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988) does not eliminate ERF's liability for death benefits
after 312 weeks. The specific language in the statute creates the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
"for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title 35." The
statute only requires employers to pay 312 weeks of benefits, with ongoing benefits, as
outlined in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953), to be paid "out of the special fund provided for
in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68." Section 68 also requires employers/carriers to pay
benefits, under certain circumstances, directly to ERF, an indication of ERF's liability to pay
death benefits under this statute. In 1993, the Court of Appeals in Hales, supra, specifically
recognized ERF's liability to pay "a continuation of benefits by the fund [ERF] in situations
where the ERF's employer's responsibility has first been determined within the six-year
period . . . ." Id. at 542. Only in 1994, following this Court's opinion in Hales, did the
Legislature amend Section 68 to place the liability for the payment of death benefits after 312
weeks upon the employer or carrier.
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While administrative law judge Elicerio claims that the re-draft of Section 68 in 1979
was "not a model of clarity" (R. at 105), petitioners submit that the plain language of Section
68 and Section 70, particularly given the historical context of the statutes, requires ERF to pay
death benefits after an employer or carrier pays the first 312 weeks of benefits.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-70 (1953) SPECIFICALLY
PROVIDES FOR THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE FUND
TO PAY DEATH BENEFITS AFTER THE FIRST SIX YEARS.

At the time of Mr. Moore's injury, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) stated:
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this
title, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and
after all reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional benefits, the
industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits;
but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier shall not be extended, and
the additional benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for
in Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68.
Emphasis supplied.
Petitioners assert that the language in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) is clear and
unequivocal. Based upon the clarity of this statutory language, the Utah Court of Appeals
should award continuing benefits to respondent Kathleen Mae Moore from the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund. The full impact of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) is better understood
following a historical analysis of the statute.

-8-

A.

Historical Background of Utah Code Ann. $35-1-70 (1953).

The historical luikginiiiiu m Sn linn u 11a*
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matter of Hales v. Industrial Commission, supra. In Hales, the Utah Court of Appeals noted
that the predecessor of the present statute for dependent death benefits was enacted in I'» 7,
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injury, but no longer, regardless of the state of dependency of the surviving spouse or child.
The Court of Appeals in Hales further noted that the Utah Legislature in ;m aitniifii lo
remedj ' this apparc

"Mill rn;trtnl (lit statuton ancestor of current Utah Code Ann.

§35-1-70, as follows:

If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this Act, and
who, at the termination of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all
reasonable circumstances, should be entitled to additional benefits, the industrial
commission may, at its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability of
the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not be extended, but the additional
benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in subdivision (1) of
this section.

1921 Utah I aw Cli. 67, §3140(7) (emphasis supplied), as cited in Hales. 541.
As part ot il i li
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that the statutory format of the 1921 amendment remained essentially unchanged through the
date of the opinion in Hales in 1993. The Court of Appeals stated:

In over 70 years since the words now found in Section 70 were originally
adopted, they have remained essentially unchanged. The only significant
change has been that the provision was taken out of the predecessor of the death
benefits section — Section 68 — and made it's own self-standing section in 1933.
Utah Rev. Stat. §42-1-66 (1933), Although this provision for continuing death
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benefits in special cases has remained a self-contained provision up to the
present day codification in §35-1-70, its origin as part of a death benefits section
is significant.

Hales at 541-42.
The discretion of the Utah Industrial Commission to extend death benefits was
eliminated in a 1973 amendment. As noted in Hales:
Under this 1973 amendment, death benefits were to be paid after six years from
the date of injury, from the special fund provided for in §35-1-68(1), until the
termination of dependency. This amendment obviated the need for dependents
to seek the discretionary extension of death benefits under Section 70 because
the benefits were now extended as a right, assuming only that the individual
remained in a dependent condition. The 1973 amendment, automatically
extending benefits, was recodified in 1979 as Utah Code Ann. §35-168(2)(b)(ii) (1979), pursuant to legislation that further refined calculation of
benefits to be paid "following the expiration of the first six-year period." 1979
Utah Laws Ch. 138, Section 3.

Id. at 542.
In summary, the Court of Appeals in Hales specifically recognized that a wholly
dependent person, already receiving death benefits, was entitled to receive, automatically,
ongoing death benefits, after six years from the date of injury, from the "special fund." Thus,
Kathleen Mae Moore, the admittedly wholly dependent person in the case at bar, should be
entitled to receive ongoing death benefits from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.

B.

Utah Code Ann. $35-1-70 (1953) was in effect on July L 1989.

The law to apply in any given case is the law in existence at the time of the industrial
injury. Smith v. Industrial Commission. 549 P.2d 448 (Utah 1976). In the present case, Utah
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Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) was in effect at both the time of Mr. Moore's injury and his
subsequent death, and contained the exact language as cueii ht •„:.•

..,-.,.
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POINT II
UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-68 (1988), AS AMENDED, DID
NOT ELIMINATE ERF's LIABILITY FOR DEATH BENEFITS
AFTER 312 WEEKS.
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A.

ERF's Liability to Pay Benefits is Specifically Referenced in Utah Code Ann.
§35-1-68 (1988).

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988) begins with the following sentence:
(1) There is created an Employers' Reinsurance Fund for the purpose of making
payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2. Title 35. This fund shall succeed to all
monies previously held in the "Special Fund/ the "Combined Injury Fund," or the
"Second Injury Fund." The state treasurer shall be the custodian of the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund, and the commission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable
administration assistance may be paid from the proceeds of the fund. The attorney
general may appoint a member of his staff to represent the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund in all proceedings brought to enforce claims against it.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The specific language of this statute recognizes that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
was created "for the purpose of making payments in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2, Title
35." The Employers' Reinsurance Fund argues, however, that it has no liability whatsoever to
make death benefit payments under this same statute. Petitioners respectfully submit that if the
Utah Legislature had intended to eliminate liability on the part of the Employers' Reinsurance
Fund, it could have easily done so within the body of the statute itself. To the contrary, the
statutory language specifically states that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is created "for the
purpose of making payments . . . ." Thus,' it makes little sense for the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund to argue that the language contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68 (1988)
actually means that the Employers' Reinsurance Fund is created for the purpose of not making
payments in death cases.
To the contrary, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's liability is specifically referenced
in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-70 (1953) which states, in pertinent part: " . . . and the additional
-12-

benefits allowed shall be paid out of the special fund provided for in Subdivision (1) of Section
35-1-68." (Emphasis supplied J
' ' n p i | " ns;nio

V
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'frili'M, the liability of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for payment in

death cases is crystal clear.
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The

Employers' Reinsurance Fund argues that, despite this distinct limitation on benefits payable
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Petitioners respectfully submit that

this argument is inaccurate for the following six reasons.
First, there is specific language within Section 68 requiring employer .
pa> death benefits f :)ii: 312 * eel :s ' rhere is, however, no specific language in the statute
requiring payments by employees or carriers beyond 312 weeks. Moreover, in connection
with Section 70, there is a clear restriction on the liability of employer s -,i ati i ICI s lo | u v
dealh benefits bevonJ H 1 weeks
Second, Utah Code Ann. §35-l-68(2)(b) deals specifically with the payment of benefits
to partly dependent persons .m il'ic iinic oi ikviiit'lii
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reference that payments under this section "shall be paid to such persons during their
dependency by the employer or its insurance carrier." (Utah Code Ann. §3> I -1>81J n r
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or carrier should pay benefits under this particular circumstance. The Legislature did not
make a similar reference for the payment of benefits by the employer or carrier oeyond 312
weeks. Moreover, if the employer/carrier's liability to pay death benefits continued implicitly
throughout the statute (as argued by ERF), the Legislature would not have deemed it necessary
to reference liability "by the employer or its insurance carrier" later in the statute.
Third, Utah Code Ann. §35-l-68(2)(d) specifically requires an employer or carrier to
pay to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund the difference between the amounts paid to wholly or
partly dependent persons and $30,000, if the total amount of the award paid by the employer
or carrier is less than $30,000. It makes little sense to have an employer or carrier pay
benefits to the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for death cases if the Employers Reinsurance
Fund has no liability whatsoever for death benefits. The logical assumption under this
language of Section 68 is that the employer/carrier which pays less than $30,000 in a death
case (a relatively small amount) should be required to pay the difference to ERF to help fund
ERF when it has to pay death benefits.
Fourth, the Court of Appeals in Hales, supra, recognized that there had been a number
of statutory changes to Utah Code Ann. §35-1-68. The Court stated:
Again the 1921 amendment of the death benefits statute remedied the situation in which
the six-year limitation had run, but an employee's survivors were still dependent and in
need. This amendment allowed the Industrial Commission to extend benefits, at its
discretion, for those dependent individuals. So long as death benefits as of right
automatically ceased after the six year limitation, the escape valve provided in what is
now section 70 was necessary to remedy injustices. However, in 1973 the death
benefits statute was amended to automatically provide benefits "following the period
during which the employer or its insurance carrier is required to pay benefits under this
act . . . during the period of their dependency/ 1973 Utah Laws ch. 67,
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§ 5 (codified as Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(4) (1973)) I Jnder this 1973 amendment,
death benefits were to be paid, after six years from the date of injury, from the special
fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1) until the termination of dependency. n5 This
amendment obviated the need for dependents to seek the discretionary extension of
death benefits under section 70 because the benefits were now extended as of right,
assuming only that the individual remained in a dependent condition. The 1973
amendment, automatically extending benefits, was recodified in 1979 as Utah Code
Ann, § 35-1 -68(2)(b)(ii)( 1979), pursuant to legislation that further refined the
calculation of benefits to be paid "following the expiration of the first six-year p1979 Utah Laws ch. 138, § 3 . n6
M. at 542.
Significantly, endnote six, as cited in the foregoing quotation, explain: ...
'

'

:^

'"s analysis. The Court stated:

The former Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii)(1979) is now codified as §35-168(2)(a)(ii)(1992 Supp.). We note that none of the several amendments to this section
have any bearing on our analysis. Our analysis and conclusion apply to all of the
permutations of section 68,

Id. at 542. (Emphasis supplied.)

The importance of the Hales decision will be outlined in greater detail below; nevertheless, the
analysis of the decision in Hales expressly eviscerates ERF's argument that the l l '7 v '
ai nei ldi i lei it to Sectioi i 68 eliminated ERF's liability for the payment of death benefits. •
Fifth, petitioners respectfully submit that if the statutory language of Section 70 does
not apply to the present caj>i, tht statute tan neui .i|i|il, in ,i

i ,isi

IVliiiuhrr i i Lilk n * flu

Employers' Reinsurance Fund and/or the Labor Commission to outline how death benefits can
be paid by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund under Section 70 if not under the circumstances
ot tin1, case. Simpl'i ( in, Sa!ii«

'
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than 70 years, applies unequivocally to this case absent clear, specific legislative action to the
contrary. Since the Legislature has not amended Section 70 — it is still a good law today (see
Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-416 (1997) - this Court should apply the plain language of the
statute to this case.
Finally, the Utah Legislature expressly amended Section 68 in 1994, adding specific
language requiring the employer or its insurance carrier to pay death benefits following the
expiration of the first 312-week period. Since Hales, supra, was decided in 1993, this 1994
amendment was likely a response to that opinion. The amended statute, with the added
language emphasized, states:
The payment by the employer or its insurance carrier to wholly dependent
persons during dependency following the expiration of the first 312-week period
described in Subjection (5)(a)(i) shall be an amount equal to the weekly benefits
paid to those wholly dependent persons during that initial 312-week period,
reduced by 50% of any weekly federal Social Security death benefits paid to
those wholly dependent persons.
Utah Code Ann. §35-l-68(5)(a)(ii) (1994) (emphasis supplied).
With this clear legislative change in 1994, ERF can now proclaim that it has no further
liability for death benefits. However, up until this 1994 amendment, ERF must accept its
liability to pay ongoing death benefits at the expiration of the first 312 weeks of
employer/carrier liability.
Overall, petitioners submit that the language of Section 68 clearly creates the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund "for the purpose of making payments . . . ." Given the specific
language of Section 68, and its historical context, this Court should reject ERF's argument that
it has no liability, under any circumstances, to make death benefit payments under this statute.
-16-

B.

Hales vs. Industrial Commission, supra. Expressly Refers to Liability of the
Employers' Reinsurance Fund for Death Benefits Under Section 68.

sustained a compensable injury on May 24, 1982. He initially was awarded a 32% permanent
partial impairment and, eventually, permanent total disability benefits. Petitioner died on

benefits was denied by the carrier on the grounds of the six year statute of limitations. 1 k
respondents in Hales also argued that the petitioner had an alternative remedy of obtaining

The Court of Appeals quickly reversed on the statute of limitations' argument, finding
that Section 68(2) acts as an improper statute of repose. I "he Court's analysis is i i lucl :i n IC i e
meaningful in the present case relative to the argument that Section 70 provided an alternative
remedy to benefits from ERF.
.';

..;ru.

n Hales concluded that Section 70 did not appi,

petitioner had not been receiving benefits from the employer under Section 70 during the first
six years of liability. The court stated:

Ihis legislative history reveals that the phrase "receiving the benefits" under
Section 70 was intended to refer to the beneficiary receiving benefits in his or
her ow n rights i.e., death benefits payable to the dependent - not the
employee receiving other kinds of benefits calculated in part, and only where
the maximum was not reached, with reference to dependents Thus, Section 70
simply does not apply to the instant case.

Id., at 542.

-17-

With the case reversed and remanded to the labor commission, the Court of Appeals in
Hales specifically referenced ERF's potential liability (the Fund) in endnote five under
§68(2)(b)(ii), as follows:
We express no definite opinion on an issue likely to surface on remand, namely,
whether petitioners' claim should have been asserted against the fund [Employers'
Reinsurance Fund] rather than respondents and, if so, whether their petitioner may
now be amended to join the fund. We note, however, that §68(2)(b)(ii) appears
only to contemplate a continuation of death benefits bv the fund in situations where
the employer's responsibility has first been determined within the six-vear period
and does not appear to hold open the avenue of proceeding directly against the
fund in situations, like this one, where death occurs outside the six-year period.

Id. at 542. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals in Hales expressly held that §68)2)(b)(ii) contemplates "a
continuation of death benefits bv the fund in situations where the employer's responsibility has
first been determined within the six-year period. . . ." Since the employer's liability in Hales
had not been first determined within the six-year period, the Court of Appeals gave no
"definitive opinion" on this particular issue. However, that uncertainty does not apply to the
instant case. In the instant case, Kathleen Mae Moore has been specifically receiving death
benefits from the employer since May 13, 1991, about two years after the decedent's date of
injury of July 1, 1989. Moreover, petitioners are continuing to pay Ms. Moore death benefits
to the present date.
To conclude, the analysis in Hales applies specifically to the instant case because Ms.
Moore has been receiving death benefits, from the employer or its carrier, within six years
from the date of injury. Therefore, under the analysis of the Court of Appeals in Hales, the
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benefits to f\ Is Moore at the expiration of the first six years should continue to be paid to hei
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund.
CONCLUSION

Read in tandem, Section 68 and Section 70 of the Act provide that an employer or
c a n ici iiiiiiiMI pas d e a l 1» I r m i i f s ftti u p I n il ' w e e k s aflri llm ill lit: mil lilt iiiiiiiiiii

M nil ilii

Employers' Reinsurance Fund making payments thereafter. In analyzing this exact issue in
Hales v. Industrial Commission, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically referenced "a
: .:tl i bei lefits bj til: le • fi ind" I it l :Iet S e c t i o i i 6 8

I "Il: :ie C :::n n il: if

thus follow the plain language of Section 68 and Section 70 and award benefits to Ms. Moore
from the Employers' Reinsurance Fund. As a part of its Order, the Court of Appeals should
reqi lii e the Employer s' R n n i M

•

...«•.-.-.

Moore in excess of 312 weeks of benefits.
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of July, 1998.
CKBURN &

Michael E. Dyer
//
Dori K. Petersen
[/
Attorneys for petitioners, Stouffer Food
Corporation and/or Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.
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Marilyn R. Hales, Widow; Delbert R. Hales, Monica M. Hales, and Cristal E. Hales, Minor Dependent
Children; and Robyn L. Chambers, Former Wife of David K. Hales, deceased, Petitioners, v. The
Industrial Commission of Utah; Emery Mining Corporation, aka Utah Power & Light Company; and
Energy Mutual Insurance Co., Respondents.
Case No. 920319-CA
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH
211 Utah Adv. Rep. 51; 854 P.2d 537; 1993 Utah App. LEXIS 87
April 23, 1993, FILED
PRIOR HISTORY: [**1] Original Proceeding in this
Court
COUNSEL:
Virginius Dabney (Argued), Dabney & Dabney, P.C.,
Attorneys at Law for Petitioner, 350 South 400 East,
Suite 202, Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
Rinehart L. Peshell (Argued), Fairbourn & Peshell,
Attorneys at Law for Respondents, Emery Mining &
Energy Mutual, 7321 South State, Midvale, UT 84047.
Benjamin A. Sims, General Counsel, Industrial
Commission of Utah, Heber M. Wells Building, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600.
JUDGES: Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Orme.
OPINIONBY: GREGORY K. ORME
OPINION: [*538] OPINION
(For Publication)
ORME, Judge:
Petitioners appeal the Industrial Commission's order
denying their motion for review of an administrative law
judge's decision holding they were not entitled to dependent death benefits. The basis of petitioners' appeal is
that the statute under which their claims were denied,
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), is an unconstitutional statute of repose. We agree and accordingly
reverse the Commission's order, nl
nl Because we find the section an unconstitutional
statute of repose, we need not address petitioners'
second argument that the provision violates their

equal protection rights under the Utah Constitution.
See Warde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123,
130 (Utah App. 1992); Wrolstad v. Industrial
Comm'n, 786 R2d 243, 244 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 R2d 1138 (Utah 1990).
[**2]
FACTS
David K. Hales sustained a compensable injury on
May 24, 1982, while employed by Emery Mining
Corporation. He was initially paid temporary, total disability compensation and was awarded 32% permanent,
partial disability compensation for orthopedic and internal medical problems, anxiety, depression, and intractable pain. Eventually, he was awarded permanent, total disability compensation. Mr. Hales died
on November 25, 1988, more than six years after the
accident.
Petitioners allege that the cause of Mr. Hales's death
was his industrial accident and, as required by Utah
Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(a) (1979), they filed dependents' death claims within one year of the date of his
death. Emery Mining Corporation, Mr. Hales's employer, and its workers' compensation insurance carrier,
Energy Mutual Insurance Company, denied responsibility for death benefits based on the time limitation found
in Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1979), which provides, in part:
In case injury causes death within the period of six years
from the date of the accident, the employer or insurance
carrier shall pay the burial expenses of the deceased as
provided in section 35-1-81, and further benefits [**3]
[provided in subsequent subsections of section 68, including payments to the deceased's dependents].
On April 3, 1992, the administrative law judge held
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that petitioners' claims were indeed barred by this statute
because Mr. Hales died more than six years after the accident that allegedly caused his death. On April 17,
1992, petitioners filed a motion for review with the
Commission alleging that the statutory provision in section 35-1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitution's open
courts provision by extinguishing their constitutional
right to litigate a valid claim before their right to file that
claim arose. See Utah Const, art. I, § 11. On May 6,
1992, the Commission affirmed the administrative law
judge's decision. In so doing, the Commission noted
the likelihood that it would be reversed by this court
on the authority of Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission,
786 R2d 243 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 795 R2d 1138
(Utah 1990), and Velarde v. Industrial Commission, 831
P. 2d 123 (Utah App. 1992), but expressed [*539] the
view it had no power to rule on the statute's constitutionality. n2 [**4]
n2 The Industrial Commission also expressed confusion as to whether judicial review of its decision
would be initially in this court or by trial de novo in
the district court. The administrative law judge's decision and the Industrial Commission's review constitute formal adjudicative proceedings. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63-46b-4 (1989). Review is properly
in this court. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1989).
See, e.g., Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d
123 (Utah App. 1992); Wrolstad v. Industrial
Comm'n, 786 R2d 243 (Utah App.), cert, denied,
795 R2d 1138 (Utah 1990). No purpose would be
served by a trial de novo in the district court where
the relevant facts are not in dispute and the issue
is solely one of law. Cf. Alumbaugh v. White,
800 R2d 825 (Utah App. 1990) (per curium) (disputed factual finding, made without formal hearing,
reviewed by trial de novo in district court).

[**5]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act permits us
to grant relief if the petitioners have been substantially
prejudiced because "the agency action, or the statute or
rule on which the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied." Utah Code Ann. §
63-46b-16(4)(a) (1989). Whether the statute is constitutional presents a question of law which we consider de
novo. See Velarde, 831 P2d at 125.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Petitioners assert that Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2)
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(1979), and the various versions thereof subsequently
enacted in the course of amendment and recodification,
is an unconstitutional statute of repose in violation of
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution. Section
35-1-68(2) provides that employers or their insurance
carriers shall pay death benefits to dependents only when
the work-related injury "causes death within the period
of six years from the date of accident." Petitioners claim
this statute leaves dependents without a remedy if an injured worker survives more than six years from the date
of his industrial injury and then dies. Because the statute
terminated the dependents' cause [**6] of action before
it arose, petitioners argue, the statute acts as one of repose. Furthermore, petitioners argue that no adequate,
alternative remedy exists and thus the statute of repose
is unconstitutional. See Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp.,
717 R2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985).
ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The difference between a statute of limitations and a
statute of repose is that
[a] statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed
within a specified period of time after a legal right has
been violated or the remedy for the wrong committed is
deemed waived. A statute of repose bars all actions after
a specified period of time has run from the occurrence
of some event other than the occurrence of an injury that
gives rise to a cause of action.

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717P.2d 670, 672 (Utah
1985). "A statute of repose . . . prevents suit a statutorily specified number of years after a particular event
occurs, without regard to when the cause of action accrues." Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123,
125 (Utah App. 1992). An action accrues, generally,
"upon the [**7] happening of the last event necessary to
complete the cause of action." Becton Dickinson & Co.
v. Reese, 668 R2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1983).
In the instant case, petitioners' cause of action accrued
upon the death of Mr. Hales, yet the six-year period of
section 68(2) had already run so as to bar the assertion of their claim. Consequently, section 68(2) acts as
a statute of repose. See Velarde, 831 R2d at 126-27
(statute denying silicosis death benefits unless death results within three years from last day employee worked
held to be unconstitutional statute of repose). Unless
the law provides an "effective and reasonable" alternative remedy, the statute is unconstitutional. Berry, 717
R2dat680. n3
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n3 If there is no substitute or alternative remedy
provided, the statute of repose may be justified only
if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated" and the means selected to remedy the evil are
not "arbitrary or unreasonable." Berry, 717R2d at
680. Respondents do not argue that there is any
social or economic evil to be eliminated and, therefore, the issue is confined to whether a reasonable
alternative remedy is available.
[**8]
[*540] Respondents argue that section 35-1-68 does
not violate the open courts provision of the Utah
Constitution "because Petitioners can still pursue their
claims against the Employers Reinsurance Fund," formerly the second injury fund. Respondents claim section 35-1-68(2) does not cut off the claims of the deceased's dependents, but merely limits the liability of
the employer or insurance carrier for death benefits to
the period of six years from the date of the employee's
injury. As to benefits payable after the six years, dependents have an alternative remedy by pursuing their
claims against the special fund, provided for in section
35-1-68(1), under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988).
Section 70 provides, in its entirety, as follows:
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this title, at the termination of such
benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and under all
reasonable circumstances should be entitled to additional
benefits, the industrial commission may, in its discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability
of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall not
be extended, and the additional benefits allowed shall
[**9] be paid out of the special fund provided for in
Subdivision (1) of Section 35-1-68.
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988) (emphasis added).
Based upon the above quoted statutes, respondents argue that although the employee receives the check under
section 67, the dependents are included in the calculations determining benefits and the dependents, therefore, are receiving benefits, albeit through the injured
employee. Consequently, respondents continue, petitioners were receiving benefits pursuant to section 70
[**10] and may proceed against the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1). Respondents conclude
that even if section 68(2) extinguishes petitioners' death
benefit claims against the employer before they arise,
this alternative remedy available to them through section
70 precludes section 68(2) from being unconstitutional.
Respondents bolster their argument by submitting that
if section 70 did not apply in the instant case, it would
never apply.
Petitioners respond by arguing that just because the
minimum permanent disability compensation an employee may receive pursuant to section 67 includes, as
part of the calculation, $ 5 for a dependent spouse plus
$ 5 for each dependent minor child, the dependents here
were not necessarily "receiving the benefits" for purposes of section 70. Furthermore, petitioners submit,
without contravention, that Mr. Hales's disability pay
did not include the $ 5 per dependent allowance referred
to in section 67 because he was collecting the maximum weekly rate without the additional dependents' allowance being considered.
By analyzing both the scheme of the relevant statutes
and their history, we conclude that section 70 does not
provide [**11] the beneficiaries with an "effective and
reasonable alternative remedy." Berry, 717 R 2d at 680.
B. Statutory Scheme

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-70 (1988)(emphasis added).
Respondents argue that petitioners were receiving benefits under "this title," and thus have an alternative remedy pursuant to section 70, because Mr. Hales was receiving permanent, total disability benefits under Utah
Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988). That section states that
an "employee shall receive" compensation which
may not be more than 85 % of the state average weekly
wage at the time of the injury . . . [and] may not be less
than the sum of $ 45 per week, plus $ 5 for a dependent
spouse, plus $ 5 for each dependent child under the age
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent
minor children. . . .

The statutory scheme specifically distinguishes between employee payments and [*541] payments to dependents. Section 35-1-66 sets out the compensation
that an "employee . . . may receive" for his or
her permanent, partial disability. Utah Code Ann. §
35-1-66 (1988)(emphasis added). Similarly, section 67
outlines the disability payments an "employee shall receive." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1988)(emphasis
added). Both sections provide that the minimum compensation a worker shall receive is to be a sum certain
plus $ 5 if the worker has a dependent spouse, plus $ 5
for dependent children under 18, up to a maximum of
four such dependent children. The maximum compensation allowed by these sections, which is what Mr. Hales
apparently received, makes no reference to dependents
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and is based on an entirely different formula. Just because the existence of a dependent spouse or dependent
children increases the minimum compensation a partially
or totally disabled employee receives, it does not follow
that those dependents are [**12] receiving benefits for
purposes of section 70. There is no requirement that the
additional $ 5 be paid over to or used for the benefit
of the dependents. By contrast, section 68 specifically
provides for benefits that are paid to dependents. See
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(2) (1988). Thus, section
70 applies only to dependents who have been receiving
benefits in their own right.
A historical review of sections 70 and 68 confirms
our conclusion that receipt of disability payments by an
injured employee with dependents does not constitute
receipt of benefits by dependents for purposes of section
70.
C. Statutory History
The predecessor of the present dependent death benefits statute, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68 (1988), was
first enacted by the Utah Legislature in 1917. 1917
Utah Laws ch. 100, § 79. That original statute provided death benefits to dependents, paid by the employer
or its insurer, for the period "between the date of the
death, and six years after the date of the injury," but no
longer. 1917 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 79(2). As originally adopted, the death benefits ended six years after the
injury regardless of whether the spouse or child might
still be [**13] dependent and in need. n4 Obviously in
an attempt to remedy this harsh scheme, the 1917 death
benefits statute was amended four years later to include
the following language, which language is the statutory
ancestor of the current section 70:
If any wholly dependent persons, who have been receiving the benefits of this Act, and who, at the termination
of such benefits are yet in a dependent condition, and
under all reasonable circumstances, should be entitled to
additional benefits, the industrial commission may, at its
discretion, extend indefinitely such benefits; but the liability of the employer or insurance carrier involved shall
not be extended, but the additional benefits allowed shall
be paid out of the special fund provided for in subdivision 1 of this section.

1921 Utah Laws ch. 67, § 3140(7) (emphasis added).
n4 The failings of such a system are highlighted in
the scenario where a dependent child was one year
old at the time of the employee's injury and the benefits ended automatically, with no chance of exten-
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sion, when the child was only seven years old.
[**14]
The initial placement of the language of section 70
within the death benefits statute demonstrates that the
phrase "receiving the benefits" referred to dependents
receiving benefits - death benefits — in their own right;
the provision has no relevance to dependents of employees who have been receiving disability benefits, but who
have not themselves been receiving benefits. And this
holds true even if the dependents have been taken into
account in calculating the amount of disability benefits
received by the employee.
In over seventy years since the words now found in
section 70 were originally adopted, they have remained
essentially unchanged. The only significant change has
been that the provision was taken out of the predecessor
of the death benefits section - section 68 ~ and made
its own self-standing section in 1933. Utah Rev. Stat.
§ 42-1-66 (1933). Although this provision [*542] for
continuing death benefits in special cases has remained a
self-contained provision up to the present day codification in section 35-1-70, its origin as a part of the death
benefits section is significant.
Again, the 1921 amendment of the death benefits
statute remedied the situation in which [**15] the sixyear limitation had run, but an employee's survivors
were still dependent and in need. This amendment allowed the Industrial Commission to extend benefits, at
its discretion, for those dependent individuals. So long
as death benefits as of right automatically ceased after the six year limitation, the escape valve provided in
what is now section 70 was necessary to remedy injustices. However, in 1973 the death benefits statute was
amended to automatically provide benefits "following
the period during which the employer or its insurance
carrier is required to pay benefits under this act . . .
during the period of their dependency." 1973 Utah Laws
ch. 67, § 5 (codified as Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-68(4)
(1973)). Under this 1973 amendment, death benefits
were to be paid, after six years from the date of injury,
from the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68(1)
until the termination of dependency. n5 This amendment obviated the need for dependents to seek the discretionary extension of death benefits under section 70
because the benefits were now extended as of right, assuming only that the individual remained in a dependent
condition. The 1973 amendment, automatically [**16]
extending benefits, was recodified in 1979 as Utah Code
Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii) (1979), pursuant to legislation
that further refined the calculation of benefits to be paid
"following the expiration of the first six-year period."
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1979 Utah Laws ch. 138, § 3. n6
n5 We express no definitive opinion on an issue
likely to surface on remand, namely, whether petitioners' claim should have been asserted against the
fund rather than respondents and, if so, whether their
petition may now be amended to join the fund. We
note, however, that section 68(2)(b)(ii) appears only
to contemplate a continuation of death benefits by
the fund in situations where the employer's responsibility has first been determined within the six-year
period and does not appear to hold open the avenue
of proceeding directly against the fund in situations,
like this one, where death occurs outside the six-year
period.
J
(

n6 The former Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-68(2)(b)(ii)
(1979) is now codified as § 35-l-68(2)(a)(ii) (1992
Supp.). We note that none of the several amendments
to this section have any bearing on our analysis. Our
analysis and conclusion apply to all of the permutations of section 68.

[**17]
This legislative history reveals that the phrase "receiving the benefits" under section 70 was intended to refer
to the beneficiary receiving benefits in his or her own
right - i.e., death benefits payable to the dependent - not to the employee receiving other kinds of benefits
calculated in part, and only where the maximum was not
reached, with reference to dependents. Thus, section 70
simply does not apply to the instant case. n7
n7 Admittedly, under the present statutory scheme
in which the extension of benefits beyond the sixyear period is no longer discretionary with the
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Commission so long as death benefit recipients remain dependent, section 70 would rarely, if ever, be
applied. It appears the section escaped repeal, as
no longer necessary, by virtue of its separate section
status. As a glance at the annotation notes will show,
the Legislature has repeatedly tinkered with section
68, unmindful that, from 1973 on, those changes
rendered section 70, to which no particular legislative attention seems to have been paid for over seven
decades, quite unnecessary.
[**18]
D. Inadequate Alternative
Finally, even if we were to assume that section 70
somehow applies in this case, it does not save the statute
of repose because it does not provide an effective and
reasonable alternative remedy. The extension of benefits permitted under section 70 is wholly discretionary.
This discretionary extension of benefits is not a remedy
that is constitutionally equivalent to the right to receive
death benefits that the statute of repose terminates before
it has accrued.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission's decision is reversed, as it predicted, [*543] and the case is
remanded for such proceedings as may now be appropriate.
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Judith M. Billings, Judge
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LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No- 3971

KATHLEEN MAE MOORE,
surviving spouse of William
Moore, deceased,
Petitioner,
vs.
STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION/
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE
FUND,
Respondents.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

HEARING:

Hearing Room 3 34, Labor Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 23,
1997 at 1:00 o'clock p.m.
Said hearing was
canceled per agreement of the parties.

BEFORE:

Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The petitioner was represented by Sandra Dredge,
Attorney.
The respondents were represented by Michael Dyer,
Attorney.
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by
Erie Boorman, Attorney.

The petitioner in the above-referenced matter was awarded
death benefits in 1991, after the death of her husband, resulting
from a July 1, 1989 industrial accident. The petitioner received
312 weeks of death benefits, paid by the respondent insurance
carrier, Liberty Mutual Insurance, beginning on May 13, 1991. On
April 29, 1997, the Commission issued an order requiring the
respondent insurance carrier to continue paying death benefits, at
the conclusion of the 312 weeks. This order was based on written
information submitted to the Commission by the petitioner,
indicating that she remained in a dependent status. On June 12,
1997, the respondents filed a letter with the Commission,
contesting: 1) the finding of continued dependency and 2) the
finding that the respondent insurance carrier was to pay the
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continuing benefits, as opposed to the Employers Reinsurance Fund
(ERF) paying those benefits. The matter was set for a July 23,
1997 hearing, but prior to the date of the hearing, the respondents
wrote the ALJ, indicating that they had decided to withdraw their
contest to the continued dependency finding.
However, the
respondents indicated that they still objected to the finding that
it was the respondent insurance carrier, and not ERF, that was
liable to pay continuing benefits to the petitioner.
The respondents suggested to the ALJ that the issue
regarding what entity pays continuing death benefits, after the
initial 312 weeks, was a legal one, that could be resolved with
briefing and without hearing. ERF and the petitioner agreed, and
thus, a briefing schedule was arranged and the hearing was
canceled. The respondents filed their brief on September 5, 1997
and ERF (joined by the petitioner) filed its responsive brief on
September 29, 1997. The respondents replied on October 6, 1997 and
the matter was considered ready for order on that date.
ARGUMENT PRESENTED:
The respondents argue that the statutory scheme applicable
to this claim is that which was in existence at the time of the
industrial injury, on July 1, 1989.
This is agreed to by all
parties. What is contested is what that statutory scheme requires.
The respondents argue that, many years ago, the statutory scheme
for death benefits resulted in only 312 weeks payable by the
employer/carrier, with no on-going benefits.
Later, the
legislature enacted what is now U.C.A. 35-1-70, to allow for
payment of death benefits after the initial 312 weeks, at the
discretion of the Commission, but making these payments payable by
a special fund, which is currently called the Employers Reinsurance
Fund (ERF).
Then, the respondents argue that, in 1973, the
legislature changed this discretionary continuation of benefits to
an automatic continuation, if dependency continued, with the
special fund still being the liable entity to pay continuing
benefits after the initial 312 weeks paid by the employer/carrier.
The respondents cite the case Hales v. Industrial Commission, 854
P. 2d 537 (Ut. Ct. App. 1993) as authority, for the historical
legislative analysis, and as authority for ERF being liable for the
continued death benefits, payable after the initial 312 weeks. In
addition, the respondents argue that it was not until 1994 that the
legislature changed the wording of U.C.A. 35-1-68, to reflect that
continuing benefits, after the initial 312 weeks, were payable by
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the employer/carrier (as opposed to by the special fund or ERF).
The respondents argue that, prior to that 1994 change in U.C.A. 351-68, ERF was the liable entity for continuing benefits after the
initial 312 weeks of benefits.
The response of ERF actually agrees that the respondents'
analysis of the legislative history, up to 1973, is correct.
However, ERF argues that that history is not really relevant to the
current controversy. Per ERF, it is the 1979 amendment to U.C.A.
35-1-68, still in effect as of the date of the deceased's
industrial accident, in 1991, that applies in this case. ERF
acknowledges that the 1973 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-70, cited by
respondents, specifically placed liability for continuing death
benefits, after the initial 312 weeks, on the special fund (or
ERF), but ERF argues that this was changed, in 1979. Per ERF,
U.C.A. 35-1-68 was amended, in 1979, to reflect that the
employer/carrier was liable for the continued death benefits, after
the initial 312 weeks. In addition, ERF argues that, at the same
time, language in U.C.A. 35-1-68 specifically referring to special
fund liability, after the initial 312 weeks, was deleted.
Therefore, per ERF, the 1979 scheme, still in effect in 1991, and
thus applicable to this case, provides for employer/carrier
liability only, with no liability for death benefits for ERF. ERF
also argues that the Hales case, cited by the respondents, does not
address the issue of ERF liability for continuing death benefits
beyond the initial 312 weeks of benefits.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The ALJ agrees generally with the analysis of ERF and finds
that there is no liability for ERF for continuing death benefits,
after the initial 312 weeks, in this particular case.
The
respondents simply fail to recognize, or discuss, in their
analysis, the 1979 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-68.
It is that
amendment (i.e. the 1979 amendment) that is the law that applies to
this case, as it was still in effect in 1991, when the deceased had
his industrial accident. The respondents stop their historical
legislative analysis in 1973, and thereby ignore the fact that the
statutory scheme was significantly changed in 1979. The ALJ agrees
with ERF, that the Hales case does not address the issue of which
entity pays benefits after the initial 312 weeks (the Court states
as much in footnote #5, at 542), and thus, the Hales analysis is
unhelpful in resolving the issue to be decided in this case. The
one exception to this would be that Hales does point out that
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U.CA. 35-1-70 probably should have been deleted from the statutory
scheme long ago, as it became unnecessary after 1973, when all
further amendments relating to payment of death benefits were
placed in U.CA. 35-1-68.
The ALJ will elaborate on these
conclusions to follow.
The redrafting of U.CA. 35-1-68, in 1979 (which redraft
applies in this case) , is not a model of clarity, but when viewed
in context of all the changes, the intention of the drafters can be
discerned.
The ALJ finds that one intention was to remove
liability for continuing death benefits (after the initial 312
weeks) from the special fund (or ERF) and place it back on the
employer/carrier. This intention is discernable in two changes:
1) the reorganization of the subsections, to place
the new language regarding payment of continuing
benefits under the general language describing the
liability of the employer / carrier (see Laws of
Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p. 777, subsection (2) (b) (ii) )
and;
2) the deletion/removal of language, previously in
the statute, specifically stating that the special
fund (or ERF) was to pay continuing benefits (see
Laws of Utah, 1979, Ch. 138, p. 778, subsection
(2)(d)) interlined language).
These two above-noted changes, when viewed together, indicate to
the ALJ that the 1979 legislature sought to shift the liability of
the continuing benefits back to the employer/carrier.
Unfortunately, if certain unchanged language, in the 1979
version of U.CA. 35-1-68, is read out of context of the overall
changes, they might be read to refer to a continuing limitation of
employer/carrier liability to 312 weeks only. This is the case
with the last sentence of Subsection (2) (b) (i) . It indicates "not
to exceed six years or 312 weeks after the date of injury."
However, once again, if this is read in context of the entire
subsection, it becomes clear that this is a limitation on how long
the employer/carrier pays benefits per the calculation specified in
(2)(b)(i).
In other words the limitation is just on what rate is
paid for the first 312 weeks. The next subsection, (2) (b) (ii)
specifies how the calculation is made after the initial 312 weeks.
However, this subsection, regarding continuing benefits, also deals
with employer/carrier liability, because it is part of section (2) ,
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which specifies at the beginning "... the employer or insurance
carrier shall pay • . . benefits in the amounts and to the persons as
follows.11
Another part of the statutory scheme, that read out of
context might suggest a limitation of employer/carrier liability to
the initial 312 weeks, is U.C.A. 35-1-70. That section was enacted
to allow discretionary continuation of benefits before the
automatic continuation was codified in 1973 (in U.C.A. 35-1-68) .
That statute has been left intact, since it was initially passed,
even though the continuing benefits that it refers to have been
addressed in U.C.A. 35-1-68 since at least 1973. This is referred
to in the Hales case that the respondents have cited for other
purposes.
In footnote #7, at 542, the Court notes that the
placement of automatic continuation of benefits after the 312
weeks, in U.C.A. 35-1-68 in 1973, made U.C.A. 35-1-70 unnecessary.
The Court opines that it should have been repealed when the
automatic continuation was codified in 1973. The ALJ agrees with
this logical analysis and finds that the legislature did not mean
for this section to specify liability for ERF following the initial
312 weeks of death benefits, after the legislature created
employer/carrier liability for these continuing benefits in 1979.
To read it otherwise would mean that the legislature intended to
have two mutually exclusive provisions to be in existence, one
specifying employer/carrier liability for the continuing benefits
and the other specifying ERF liability for those same benefits. It
is much more logical to presume that U.C.A. 35-1-70 is just an
unnecessary section that "escaped" repeal, as the Court in Hales
suggests.
There is one final element of the statutory scheme that, if
viewed in isolation, might suggest special fund, or ERF, liability
for continuing benefits, prior to 1994. This is a 1994 addition to
the U.C.A. 35-1-68 subsection dealing with the computation of the
rate to be paid for continuing benefits. In 1994, the legislature
added the phrase "by the employer or its insurance carrier" to that
subsection, to designate which entity is paying the continuing
benefits. The respondents argue that this addition shows that the
legislature was changing the payor of the continuing benefits, and
that prior to the change, the special fund or ERF was liable for
those continuing benefits. The ALJ disagrees with this analysis
and finds that the 1994 addition was meant only as clarification.
This is because, as noted above, the subsection dealing with the
computation of continuing benefits has been located in the section
dealing with what benefits are payable by the employer/carrier,
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since 1973.
Therefore, even without the 1994 addition of
clarifying language, the statute logically reads to indicate
employer/carrier liability for the continuing benefits. The ALJ
believes that the 1994 addition (made in U.C.A. 35-1-68(5) (a) (ii))
was made because, as noted above, due to the length of section (5) ,
the subsections tend to get read in isolation of the initial
language, indicating that all of the subsections to follow specify
employer/carrier liability (the subsections are necessary in order
to show how to compute the benefits in various different
situations).
The 1994 clarifying language simply prevents any
misunderstanding as to the identification of the payor, if
subsection (5) (a) (ii) does get read in isolation from the
introductory language, which also specifies the identity of the
payor (i.e. the employer/carrier).

Based upon the foregoing discussion, the ALJ finds that, at
the time of the deceased's industrial injury in 1991, the death
benefits statutory scheme, the same scheme in existence since the
1979
amendment
to
U.C.A.
35-1-68,
specified
that
the
employer/carrier was liable for continuing death benefits,
following the payment of the initial 312 weeks of benefits.
Therefore, the ALJ affirms the Commission's prior order, issued by
ALJ Sims on April 29, 1997, and finds that the employer/carrier in
this matter is liable for continuing death benefits to the
petitioner.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the April 29, 1997 Surviving
Spouse Benefit Order, ordering Liberty Mutual Insurance to continue
paying death benefits to the petitioner, Kathleen Mae More, is
affirmed.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be received in the offices of the Division of
Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date hereof, specifying
in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless
received by the Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of
the date hereof, this Order shall be final and not subject to
review or appeal.
If a Motion for Review is received by the
Division of Adjudication within thirty (30) days of the date
hereof, any response of the opposing party shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days of the date of the receipt of the Motion for
Review by the Division of Adjudication in accordance with U.C.A.
Section 63-46b-12. A Motion for Review will be decided by the
Commissioner of the Labor Commission unless any of the parties
requests that the Motion for Review be decided by the Appeals Board
in accordance with U.C.A. Section 34A-1-205 within thirty (30) days
of the date hereof, or in case of a party responding to the Motion
for Review, the request must be made within 2 0 days of the date of
the Motion for Review was filed with the Division of Adjudication.
DATED this 18th day of December, 1997.

Barbara Elicerio
Administrative Law Judge
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the following parties:
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APPEALS BOARD
UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
KATHLEEN MAE MOORE,
surviving spouse of William Moore,

Applicant,

*
*
*

ORDER DENYING

*

MOTION FOR REVIEW

v.

*

STOUFFER FOOD CORPORATION,
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE CO,
and THE EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE
FUND,

*
*
*
*

Case No. 397-0001

*

Defendants.

*

Stouffer Food Corporation and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co.(referred to jointly as "Stouffer" hereafter), ask the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor
Commission to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Stouffer is liable for
continued payment of dependent's benefits to Mrs. Moore under the Utah Workers' Compensation
Act.
The Appeals Board exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(3) and Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Is Stouffer or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund ("ERF") liable for the continued payment
of Ms. Moore's dependent's benefits?
FINDINGS OF FACT
The parties do not dispute the facts of Ms. Moore's claim. The Appeals Board therefore
adopts the findings of facts set forth in the ALJ's decision.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Whether Stouffer or the ERF is liable for continued payment of Ms. Moore's dependent's
benefits depends on the application of §35-1-68 and §35-1-70 of the Act in effect during 1991, when
Ms. Moore's husband died as a result of a work-related accident.
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The ALJ has thoroughly reviewed this question of law and provided a comprehensive
analysis of the controlling statutory provisions. The ALJ's decision also addresses the specific
points raised in Stouffer's motion for review. The Appeals Board agrees with the ALJ's analysis and
therefore adopts the ALJ's decision as its own.
In affirming the ALJ's decision in this matter, the Appeals Board calls the Legislature's
attention to the need to update or eliminate the provisions of §35-1-70, for the reasons set forth in
the ALJ's decision.1
ORDER
The Appeals Board affirms the decision of the .ALJ and denies Stouffer's motion for review.
It is so ordered.
Dated this Jll day of March, 1998.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Appeals Board to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Appeals Board within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days
of the date of this order.

i

Effective July 1 1997, §35-1-70 was recodified as §34A-2-702.
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I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of
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